A Nuclear Deal in the Shadow of Proliferation Fears

The Trump administration’s reported approval of a 30-year nuclear cooperation deal with Saudi Arabia has reignited concerns about the kingdom’s intentions and regional stability. Critics argue that this pact would undermine non-proliferation efforts and create a pathway for Riyadh to develop nuclear capabilities.

A joint US-Saudi study has identified a method for Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium domestically, despite falling short of international standards. While enriching uranium is not inherently illicit, the same technology can be used to produce highly enriched uranium suitable for nuclear weapons. This dichotomy has sparked concerns that the deal would embolden Riyadh’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities.

Critics argue that this agreement sets a precedent for other countries in the region, potentially weakening non-proliferation efforts. By removing the normalization requirement with Israel from US cooperation talks, the Trump administration has effectively legitimized Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear ambitions without ensuring strict safeguards against diversion for military purposes.

Supporters of the deal claim it would strengthen US influence in the Gulf and prevent strategic competitors from gaining a foothold in the kingdom. However, this rationale raises more questions than answers. What exactly does “strengthening US influence” mean when it comes to allowing Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium? Is this not a tacit acknowledgment that Riyadh’s interests align with those of Washington?

Historically, US nuclear cooperation agreements have been guided by non-proliferation standards set in the 2009 UAE deal. In contrast, reports suggest the proposed Saudi agreement would allow enrichment and may not require the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, which provides inspectors with greater authority to verify that nuclear material is being used for civilian purposes.

Experts point out that this deal “falls below the gold standard” and lacks critical safeguards. By prioritizing US influence over non-proliferation concerns, Washington risks creating a situation where Riyadh’s nuclear ambitions are not genuinely civilian in nature.

Moreover, this agreement would be a significant departure from the standards accepted by other US partners, including the UAE. In 2009, Abu Dhabi signed a “123 Agreement” with Washington, agreeing to forgo uranium enrichment and reprocessing spent fuel – a model that has been hailed as the gold standard of non-proliferation.

The proposed deal’s failure to meet these standards raises concerns about Saudi Arabia’s commitment to preventing the diversion of nuclear material for military purposes. Given Riyadh’s stated intention to pursue a nuclear program if Iran were ever to acquire one, this agreement would be seen as a strategic move to counterbalance Tehran’s influence in the region.

In light of these concerns, Congress should scrutinize this proposal carefully and demand stricter safeguards against proliferation risks. As Andrea Stricker, deputy director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Nonproliferation Program, urges: “Congress should block this agreement.”

Ultimately, this nuclear deal stands as a microcosm of the United States’ complicated relationship with its Gulf allies. While Washington seeks to strengthen its influence in the region, it risks compromising non-proliferation efforts and emboldening Riyadh’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities. As the proposed agreement moves forward, one thing is clear: the future of US-Saudi nuclear cooperation hangs precariously in the balance, threatening to upend decades of non-proliferation policy.